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The Paracel and Spratlys Islands have become the source of rising tensions between 
the neighbouring countries of the South China Sea, which is why I feel the topic is of 
great importance. In this thesis, I attempt to provide a complete understanding of the 
multiple factors contributing to the complexity of the dispute and its difficulty in 
being settled. These factors are essential in evaluating the different approaches to 
dealing with the dispute, as well as eventually determining the most suitable method 
for dispute settlement. Therefore, I dedicate the first three chapters to discussing the 
reasons and complicating factors to the dispute, the claims of the disputants, and the 
geopolitical climate within which the dispute is under today. Taking everything into 
account, I argue that currently, the fundamental problem is that the claimants are 
under the misconception that the islands will generate maritime territory. I advocate a 
clarification to be made on the status of the features, so that the disputants can focus 
on the crucial issue of how to delimit the South China Sea. Having analysed recent 
events, tensions over the islands appear to be rising again, particularly between 
Vietnam and China. Hence, the realisation that the islands are of less value is essential 
in diminishing the potential for conflict. Nationalistic views may remain regarding the 
islands, but the stakes will have decreased, so this should dampen the problem.  
 
The remaining chapters will discuss the application of the UNCLOS and the reasons 
why its use is limited to guidance, ending finally with the possible alternative 
solutions. Ideally, the South China Sea should be delimited according to the 
provisions of the UNCLOS since all states involved have ratified this piece of 
legislation. However, I will illustrate that in practical terms, this will be an unlikely 
option, because of the geopolitics involved in the dispute, not all the claimants will 
agree to put the question of sovereignty to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
Following the realisation that the dispute is fundamentally over the maritime space, I 
will conclude that the most practical solution to the dispute in today’s geopolitical 
climate is further joint development in exploration and exploitation based on the 
JMSU Agreement in 2005, thus enhancing relations between the disputants as well as 































ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations 
ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum 
CLCS – Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone 
EIA – Energy Information Association 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
ITLS – International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea 
JMSU Agreement – Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the 
Agreement Area in the South China Sea 
LOS – Law of the Sea 
LST – Landing Ship Tank 
PRC – People’s Republic of China 
SLOC – Sea Lines of Communication 
SSF – Sub-Strategic Forces 
TAC – Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
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The Paracel and Spratly Islands within the South China Sea: how to approach 
the dispute in the context of today?  
 
Introduction 
Most people are aware of the ongoing dispute in the South China Sea, particularly 
over the Paracel and Spratly islands. Perhaps what is not so clear are the complexities 
to the dispute, and the reasons why, after decades, it still has not been settled. There is 
an abundance of literature on the contentious issue, discussing the geopolitical forces 
at work, the effect and application of the UNCLOS and possible solutions or ‘half 
measures’ in order for the States to co-operate and share the resources - thus 
decreasing the tensions and potential for conflict or even war. In this thesis, I will 
begin by discussing the many factors contributing to the complexity of the dispute. 
These can be divided into, geographical factors, possible resources, strategic benefits, 
nationalism, security issues and finally the UNCLOS. Whilst discussing the possible 
solutions it is important to keep these aspects of the dispute in mind as it will help to 
determine how to minimise potential conflict as well as realise a suitable method of 
settlement. This is because some of the factors such as nationalism and security issues 
may not be suited to an economic solution. This can be observed with the reaction of 
the Filipino nationalists to the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea (JMSU agreement) 
between Vietnam, China and the Philippines, which resulted in the failure of renewal 
of the agreement or any further discussions on opportunities for cooperation. 
Furthermore, an understanding of the geopolitical climate can establish whether the 
timing is appropriate for dialogue and again the most suitable resolution method. This 














as well as their potential power to solve the dispute militarily (a solution that should 
be avoided at all costs).   
 
After, placing the dispute into context, I will proceed to outline the fundamental 
claims of each of the states involved. I will argue that disputing over the sovereignty 
of the islands is to squander away energy and resources into, what I believe to be, an 
un-rewarding facade, since the real issue is regarding the maritime space. The 
UNCLOS is not equipped to decide the sovereignty of islands, so it cannot quickly 
settle that issue with the intention that the States can focus on the ‘true’ issue of 
maritime space. Thus, I recommend, like most other scholars, that the issue of island 
sovereignty should be dropped. However, my reasoning for this approach, is not that 
it is too difficult to determine sovereignty to the islands, but that the attainment of 
sovereignty to the islands will not give maritime territory. Since the disputants 
involved appear to be unaware of this fundamental fact, I think that the ICJ should 
issue an ‘advisory opinion’ should be issued to clarify the worth of the features of the 
Paracel and Spratlys. Once this issue has been dealt with I will discuss (what I believe 
to be the best) approach towards the core issue of delimiting the maritime space in the 




















Chapter 1: Reasons and complicating factors to the dispute 
The South China Sea Geography 
The International Hydrographic Bureau defines the South China Sea as a body of 
water in a Southwest to Northeast direction, with a Southern border 3 degrees South 
latitude between South Sumatra and Kalimantan (Karimata Straits) and a northern 
border from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China (the Strait of 
Taiwan). The area of water is the world’s second busiest international sea lane. The 
coastal geography of the region is highly complex with over 400 identified islands, 
rocks and reefs with the Paracel and Spratly Islands encompassing the majority.1 The 
Paracels consist of two groups of islands, reefs and rocks known as the Crescent and 
Amphitrite and is said to be an archipelago.2 The exact number of islets, rocks, reefs 
and shoals within the Spratly group varies between commentators with some stating 
as many as 500, but most commentators put the figure as 150-180.3 The complexity of 
the group has led to the discrepancy in the number with commentators differing on 
what features to include and to count. However, it is interesting to note that the 
Paracel and the Spratly Islands both have a total land area of only ten square 
kilimetres each, thus appearing to have little value, yet they are the focus of a rather 
tempestuous and in a sense arbitrary dispute, (this will be reflected as we explore the 
problem further).4. The true value of the small land territories may be appreciated 
from the maritime rights that they may possibly generate. As we will also ascertain, it 
is precisely their land-mass which (under the UNCLOS) prevents them from 
generating any worth, and thus I believe the sovereignty dispute of the islands is 
                                                 
1 Snyder, Scott, The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy: A Special Report 
of the United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C.:United States Institute of Peace, August 1996 
2 Schofield, Clive and Storey, Ian The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions, 
The Jamestown Foundation, November 2009, 10 
3 Schofield, Clive and Storey, Ian The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions, 
The Jamestown Foundation, November 2009, 11 














meaningless and futile. Before turning to the parties involved and their claims it is 
important to place the dispute in context.  
 
Possible Resources 
First and foremost, the South China Sea is estimated to hold between 168-220 billion 
barrels of oil.5 This is said to be an optimistic estimation given that the Russians 
Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries in 1995 estimated only 6 billion 
barrels. However, the U.S. Geological Survey conducted by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration in 1993/94 estimated 28 billion barrels of oil reserves, 
with an estimation of only 7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and a production of 
2.5 mm bpd (2004).6 It is suggested that since the neighbouring areas to the Spratlys 
are rich in oil, that it is likely that the area contains untapped reserves. As well as oil 
resources, the area is estimated to be rich in natural gas, having already discovered 
gas instead of oil in most fields. The U.S. Energy information Administration further 
suggest that natural gas could be worth 60/70% of the region’s hydrocarbon resources.  
For any state, such resources are invaluable and important to aid economic growth 
and development, but we will examine just how valuable resources are for each of the 
claimants in the geopolitical section below in Chapter 3.  
 
As well as potential oil and gas resources, it is said that the sea’s fisheries may prove 
to be ‘more commercially significant than oil’.7 Within the South China Sea total 
marine production is ranked fourth out of the nineteen fishing zones within the world, 
                                                 
5 Buszynski, Leszek and Sazlan, Iskandar (2007) ‘Maritime claims and energy cooperation in the South 
China Sea’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29(1) , 156 
6 http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts42955.htm 
7 Shephard, Allen (August 1996) ‘Testing the waters: Chinese policy in the South China Sea’ Working 














clearly illustrating the significance of its resources in terms of fish providing food for 
local communities and a valuable commodity for export.  
 
Whilst economic interests are of significance they cannot entirely be attributed for the 
Paracel and Spratly islands dispute. The talk of the potential for oil in the regions 
created interest from countries that previously had ignored the areas. This then 
increased the number of parties and claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The 
perceived economic potential of the area has certainly increased the stakes for all 
those involved and subsequently made it difficult for parties to concede defeat. Thus it 
is my belief, that for both Vietnam and China, who could be described as the original 
parties to the dispute, their initial interests were of a different nature. In fact it is 
suggested that for the Chinese, ‘the claims themselves are deeply rooted in the 
dominant traditional Chinese security thinking that stresses the importance of 
controlling the space around the core cultural territory as a vital security buffer.’8 This 
is why I feel that an economical solution would satisfy states such as Malaysia, The 
Philippines and Brunei, but it would never appease China and Vietnam. Furthermore, 
I also believe that colonization and the exploration of European nations complicated 
and confused the matter.  
 
Strategic benefits 
Some commentators have argued that the economic potential of the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands has been the source of the claims for sovereignty over them. After all, 
it was not until the 1960s and 1970s when oil companies began expressing interest in 
exploring for oil that the question of sovereignty of the area became of great 
                                                 
8 Dutta, Sujit, Securing the Sea Frontier: China’s Pursuit of Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea, 














importance. However, I think it is more accurate to say that the economic interests 
have merely intensified the matter. As a matter of fact, claims to the islands had been 
made prior to the 1960s, in particular China and Vietnam appear to have laid claim to 
the areas hundreds of years ago, both attempting to provide historical evidence to 
support their claims today. It appears evident however, that neither effectively 
occupied the two regions consequently making it difficult to determine the 
sovereignty of the islands. As mentioned above when describing what the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands comprise of, it is not surprising that neither party effectively occupied 
the areas since the land areas were so small as well as the interference from other 
states during colonization. Furthermore, one has to bear in mind that perhaps both 
parties believed that the areas were theirs without any question. Therefore why would 
they feel any need to affirm or assert sovereignty? In any case, between the twelfth 
and seventeenth century China viewed ‘itself as the centre of a universal state’ which 
‘oversaw a hierarchy of tributary states’.9 Consequently it could be argued that the 
application of modern day determination of sovereignty methods have little relevance 
or use, at least, the concept of territorial sovereignty only arrived in the South China 
Sea with colonization.  
 
Currently, however the South China Sea is an area of great strategic importance since 
it contains multiple sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which link the Indian and 
Pacific Ocean. These SLOCs are important for trade not just for the states in the 
region who are involved in the dispute, but also for the rest of the world. It is 
estimated that one-third of world trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, and it 
provides an important route for the transport of energy sources from the Middle East, 
                                                 
9 Ning Lu (1993) ‘The Spratly Archipelago: The Origins of the Claims and Possible Solutions’ 














Australia and Africa to China, Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea. As we will 
explore later, China is especially reliant on energy sources from abroad due to its 
massive consumption and lack of domestic energy sources. Therefore, freedom of 
navigation and shipping safety is essential within this area for the continuation of 
undisrupted trade (naturally then increasing economic growth). The state obtaining 
sovereignty over the area would have an exceptional amount of power and the ability 
to affect other states not just within the vicinity but all over the world. In addition, 
China controlling both the Paracel and Spratly islands with a strong naval presence in 
the area would intimidate and threaten the other countries in the neighbouring region: 
Vietnam; Philippines; Malaysia; Brunei; and Indonesia. It is important to note that the 
view would be different if it was one of the other countries who had control over the 
area. There are several reasons for this, firstly ‘the sheer geographic mass and 
centrality of the country makes it a dominant player in the international politics of the 
East Asian region’.10In addition to this fact China’s economy has been the fastest 
growing economy out of the Southeast Asian countries. Thus, ‘concerns over 
economic supremacy have thus surpassed the preciously dominant political and 
military threats posed by the country’, (however as noted above China’s economic 
supremacy is dependant on its ability to have a secure and reliable source of energy).11 
Finally, China is said to be the only Asian nation to officially be recognised as 
possessing nuclear weapons and be a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council.12 Its naval capabilities are superior to the other claimants both in 
number and in ability, but it is important to note that the ‘PRC is acutely aware of the 
increasing propagation of the “China threat” image associated with its rising power 
                                                 
10 Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, Oxon, Routledge, 2010, 
23 
11Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia, Oxon, Routledge, 2010, 26 
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